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Introduction  
  Over the summer of 2014, we have witnessed a foreign policy change of some Western-
European states towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Frustrated by the ongoing conflict some 
states like Sweden and the Vatican have recognized Palestine officially (Al Jazeera 2015). Several 
states like Ireland, Spain, France and the United Kingdom have recognized the Palestinian state 
symbolically by Parliamentary resolutions while others like Belgium and Denmark have 
suggested that they planned to do so in the near future (Arom 2014).  This seems like a drastic 
change in the foreign policy of these European states, since states like the United Kingdom and 
France, in the past, have often openly supported Israel against the recognition of the Palestinian 
state. Israel, of course, opposes any official recognition of the Palestinian state. The research 
question that arises from these events is: why have some Western European states recognized 
the Palestinian state, during the period September 2014 and December 2014, while others have 
not?  By answering this question, this thesis is hoping to open the black box of the reasons for 
states to recognize (new) states and at the same time to give more insights in the specific cases of 
recognition of Palestine.  
 This topic can be placed in a broader perspective of research in foreign policy analysis. 
Recognition of states is an emerging topic of interest. But studies of recognition focus either on 
the normative side of recognition or on the international law position and are mostly outdated. 
This paper however, focuses on the standpoint of the states that will recognize a (new) state and 
their motives to do so. The theoretical framework of this paper is mainly based on the 
approaches of Bridget Coggins (2011) and Beverly Crawford (1995). Of these approaches, 
Coggins adopts an international level approach, while Crawford focuses mainly on the domestic 
political level. By combining the approaches it is possible to get a more complete overview of the 
motives of western European states for recognizing the Palestinian state. An initial speculative 
answer is that western European states choose to recognize Palestine because of their ideological 
preferences, the diplomatic costs are low and then there is no strong Israeli interest group 
present in the recognizing state.    
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  Since the policy of non-recognition of Palestine had been in place in most Western 
European states for years, this paper aims at identifying the relevant factors for the policy 
change. An additional contribution of this thesis is that it can identify factors which can explain 
future cases of recognition of Palestine by western states and perhaps other states in general. 
 The rest of this thesis will consist of six parts. First the literature review, discusses the 
relevant literature on state recognition. Then the theoretical framework will be presented, where 
the two theoretical approaches of Coggins (2011) and Crawford (1995) will be combined with 
other existing approaches. In the following section the research design in which the variables 
and their operationalization and methodology will be discussed. Then the results and the 
discussion will be presented.    
Literature review 
  The recognition of states and more specifically of the Palestinian state has been the 
subject of many articles and books. Most of the work either focuses on international law or takes 
a normative and a state-centric approach. A problem with this literature is that scholars leave 
out one important category, namely the importance of recognition by the international 
community that, either formally or symbolically recognizes the recognition-seeking state.  
Moreover most of the work, such as for example Francis Boyle (1990), Roland Rich (1993) and 
Sanford Silverberg (1998) is quite outdated, ranging from the initial post-Soviet Union era, when 
several former Soviet states were seeking recognition to the beginning of the new millennium. 
Many of these articles coincided with the end of the cold war period and the end of the “interim 
phase” for Palestine, negotiated in the Oslo Accords of May 1999 (Bishara 1999, 5). The interim 
phase was the time period in which there was an interim government in Palestine between the 
first Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, and the Second Oslo Accords, signed in 1995. The period was 
supposed to end in May 1999, but it did not lead to the official creation of a Palestinian state 
(Bishara 1999, 5-9). In the next subsection some of the general scholarly work on state 
recognition will be discussed.  
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State recognition in international law 
  Stephen Krasner argues that statehood is given to states on a legal basis, instead of 
mainly political reasons (1999, 71). This argument is central to the declaratory theory. This 
theory argues that every entity that complies with the international legal standards of the 
Convention of Montevideo, will automatically become a state. This is also argued by 
international law scholars, such as Francis Boyle (1990). He argues that Palestine should be 
recognized as a state because it complies with almost all the conditions of international law on 
statehood (Boyle 1990, 301-302). But the fact that a state complies with the conditions does not 
mean they will be automatically be recognized by the international community1.   
  Other scholars that adopt an international law approach in scholarly work on the 
recognition of states are Roland Rich (1993) and Sanford Silverberg (1998). Rich ends his article 
with the conclusion that recognition in the end is not determined solely on a legal base but 
recognition is more a matter of political discretion (Rich 1993, 63). He contends that states have 
to consider whether recognition will contribute to a peaceful resolution of a conflict. 
Furthermore, Rich argues that states also take democratic norms into account even though this 
leads to inconsistent use of the tool of recognition (Rich 1993, 63-65). With his article he gives an 
insight in the legal conditions, that recognition-seeking states have to comply with. These 
conditions are being modified by the international community itself. Since his article focuses 
primarily on international law, he does not give clear answers to this variance in the recognition 
of states and the change of legal conditions.   
  Although Silverberg’s work gives good insights in ambiguous legal status of Palestine, 
like for example the fact that Palestine has no effective governmental control over all its 
territories, and how Palestine is in fact a functioning state, because it is able to establish 
diplomatic relations with other states. The article is not very useful to explain why some states 
                                                          
1 For instance one can think about the example of Somaliland which has not been recognized. According to Alison 
Eggers “as Somaliland  operated as an independent state for fifteen years and as it meets international legal 
standards for “statehood” is, in fact, a state” (2007, 222).  
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are recognized while others are not. The author states that the answers have to be found in 
political dynamics and that further research should focus on this aspect (Silverberg 1998, 47). 
  Furthermore, scholars like Stephen Krasner (1999), Joel Migdal2 (2001) Tanisha Fazal  
(2008; 2014)3 and international law scholars like Boyle (1990), Rich (1993) and Silverberg (1998) 
focus mainly on state-centered dynamics. They mostly take the viewpoint of the state that is 
seeking international recognition and their dynamics with other states. By contrast this paper 
argues that the state-centered dynamics and international law do not fully explain why some 
states are being recognized by one part of the international community while others remain 
unrecognized. It is therefore necessary to take both international and domestic factors into 
account.   
  More recent work on state recognition has been written by Mikulas Fabry (2010). His 
book Recognizing States deals with the recognition of states since the recognition of the United 
States in 1776 up until the recognition of new states in the post-Cold War period. His book is an 
example of a normative account of the practice of recognition of new states (Fabry 2010, 4). 
Fabry argues through different cases that the only viable method for recognition is the de facto 
recognition practiced in the 19th century by the United Kingdom and the United States (Fabry 
2010, 219). This de facto recognition doctrine means that states do not interfere in the internal 
affairs of other states, because the people of a country have the right to determine their own 
political destiny. The winner of the internal struggles will be recognized as the lawfully heirs of 
the state. Or when both states decide to divide their country into two separate states, the 
international community has to recognize both states (Fabry 2010, 219). Although Fabry’s book 
is interesting and extensive, it gives no direct insights in why states choose to recognize new 
states. It merely advocates a particular doctrine of recognition.  
                                                          
2 Migdal has written a very interesting chapter on why so many weak states stay intact, he argues these states stay 
intact because the people consider the state to be “as natural as the landscape around them”. This is primarily a 
state-centered and society-centered approach. He discards the international factors as not sufficient to explain why 
states remain intact (2001, 137). He does not consider the role of the international community. 
3 Fazal focuses in both her articles (2008; 2014) on the question why there has been an increase in the amount of 
secessionist states and not specifically on recognition. Furthermore she takes these secessionist states as her focus 
point.  
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 Towards another perspective of state recognition  
  The issue of recognition of states has led to many political struggles and even wars over 
the centuries. Many wars and disputes have been fought over recognition of independence. For 
example Great Britain declared war on France because the French recognized the independence 
of the American colonies in the 18th century (Rich 1993, 55). More recently, the unilateral 
recognition of Croatia by Germany in 1991 caused widespread European controversy (Crawford 
1995, 1-2). Also, the initiatives to recognize Palestine have put pressure on the relationships of 
the recognizing states with Israel. For example Israel has recalled its ambassador to Sweden for 
consultations, after it recognized Palestine (Calamur 2014). Therefore recognition should not 
only be analyzed from the point of view of a recognition-seeking state, but the perspective of the 
recognizing states should also be taken into account.  
Research by Crawford on the unilateral recognition of Croatia by Germany shows the 
importance of national politics (1995). The paper suggests that national politics matter to explain 
the unilateral recognition of states under certain conditions. The first condition is that domestic 
politics shape the preferences of states when decisions have to be ratified at the domestic level. 
The next condition is that national politics matter in foreign policy when there is a high level of 
uncertainty at both the international and domestic level around the particular issue. Lastly, 
national politics weigh in on the decision to recognize a state when there is no real threat to 
national security (Crawford 1995, 27). But even though Crawford puts emphasis on national 
factors, she also acknowledges the fact that international factors have to be taken into account as 
well.  The conditions Crawford brings to the table seem convincing but could also be quite case 
specific. This is because she only did an in-depth analysis of the German case. Furthermore the 
research does not take into account the actions of the rest of the international community. The 
study also neglects the possibility of different types of recognition. It is possible to recognize a 
state formally, as in the case of Germany and Croatia or symbolically by parliamentary 
resolution as in the case of France and the United Kingdom with Palestine in 2014. Because 
Germany formally acknowledged Croatia, this distinction has not been made by Crawford. In 
fact, it is hard to find any work on different types of recognition beyond the studies of 
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international law scholars who make strict distinctions between different types of formal 
recognition and their legal consequences, for example Hersch Lauterpach (1947), Ti-Chiang 
Chen (1951) and Ben Bot (1968). 
So if new membership in the international community is not just decided by domestic 
factors of a recognition-seeking state or by international legal conditions, the answer to the 
question of why some western states have recognized Palestine has to be found in the collective 
actions of members of the international community themselves. They are the ones who 
eventually decide upon who gets full membership and who does not. Coggins for instance 
argues that membership is decided by the great powers. Because if a state does not have as she 
calls it “friends in high places”, it is less likely to get recognized internationally (2011, 435). 
Coggins comes up with an alternative model of why states choose to recognize secessionist 
states. Her model focusses on the international system of states which she sees as a community 
or a social group, in which the existing members have the final say on who becomes a new 
member of the high status community. Although it is not necessary to get the consent of every 
member state, it is necessary to have at least the consent of some of the important members 
(Coggins 2011, 448).  
Coggins comes up with three broad categories of self-interested motives of why states 
choose to recognize secessionist states. The first is external security, which means that a state 
should take its own security into account when deciding upon recognizing a new state. The 
second is domestic insecurity: states should take into account secessionist groups within their 
own borders before deciding upon the recognition of new states. And lastly, Coggins argues that 
states should prefer coordination in recognition. If Great Powers disagree, it is more likely that 
the status quo, non-recognition, is maintained (2011, 449-450). A weakness in her argument is 
however that it focuses primarily on the state level. It does not take into account the societal 
level. It is for example possible that widespread popular support within a state for the 
recognition of a particular state may be the main pressure point to push a government to 
recognize a particular state.  Furthermore Coggins, similarly to Crawford, makes no clear 
distinction between different forms of recognition.  
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Theoretical section 
  The theoretical framework of the thesis will mainly build on two existing theoretical 
approaches that in isolation have deficiencies. In order to overcome the deficiencies of the 
domestic politics approach of Crawford (1995) and the international sphere approach of Coggins 
(2011), it is best to mix both approaches in order to provide a complete answer to the research 
question, to derive a set of hypotheses of both approaches and to test them to the cases of 
recognition, partial recognition and non-recognition of Palestine by Western European states. 
Furthermore within these two main frameworks, other theoretical insights from the works of 
Trevor Rubenzer (2008) and Elizabeth Oldmixon, Beth Rosenson and Kenneth D Wald. (2005) 
and George Dimitriu and Beatrice De Graaf (2014) will be used to support the main argument.   
National level theoretical approach 
  Crawford (1995) derives her theoretical framework namely from the two-level game 
metaphor of Robert Putnam (1988). She adjusted the theory for her own research to answer two 
questions. Why did Germany recognize Croatia? And why did Germany do this unilaterally? 
She divides the questions into two “games”, in which one game was played at the level of 
domestic politics, where according to her the preference for the recognition of Croatia was 
formed. For her other argument on why Germany acted unilaterally she uses a second game 
which was played at the level of the European Political Cooperation (EPC).  
  For this framework however, it is sufficient to only use the implications and variables 
identified in the first game of the domestic arena. Because that is “where the preference for 
recognition was formed” (Coggins 1995, 2). Since that is the focus of my research, it is useful to 
use the hypotheses derived from those factors in domestic politics. Crawford recognizes three 
main societal pressures that shaped the choice of Germany to recognize Croatia. Although 
Crawford herself does not mention these hypotheses explicitly herself, it is possible to derive 
them from the argument and evidence she presented.    
  The first pressure is that of public opinion, from which the hypothesis H1) can be derived 
stating that the more public opinion is in favor of recognition the more the political elites, at the 
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head of a government, will be in favor of the recognition of a recognition-seeking state. 
Crawford measures this through looking at the position of the German public opinion on this 
issue by analyzing opinion surveys (Crawford 1995, 7-8).  
  The second pressure is that of interest groups in the case of Germany recognizing 
Croatia. Crawford talks about the political pressures from Croatians living in Germany, 
especially focusing on one important figure: the emissary of Croatia who had direct contact with 
the foreign policy advisors of the German government (Crawford 1995, 8-9). The hypothesis 
H2a) that can be derived from this factor is the more pressure of interest groups is present at the 
domestic level, the more political elites at the head of a government will be in favor of the 
recognition of a recognition-seeking state. According to Rubenzer (2008), it is necessary to look 
at the organizational strength and the level of political activity of interest groups, when 
analyzing successful influence (Rubenzer 2008, 182-184). These two were the only necessary 
conditions that came forward after studying and analyzing six of the most widely cited criteria 
in the literature on interest groups and their influence (Rubenzer 2008, 169).  Organizational 
strength refers to resources and the professional lobbying capabilities but also the ability to 
mobilize people. Political activity refers the perceived propensity to vote based on foreign policy 
that favors the political means and interests of the interest group (Rubenzer 2008, 172). 
  Another hypothesis that can be derived from the interest group literature: H2b) The 
more pressure from interest groups opposing recognition is present, the more political elites, at 
the head of a government, will be against recognition of a recognition seeking state. The 
conditions of Rubenzer (2008) are also applicable for this hypothesis.  The home state is the state 
of origin of members of the interest group that opposes the recognition of the recognition-
seeking state, in this research this is the state of Israel. A problem with these interest groups is 
that Israeli and Jewish interest groups are often intertwined while they are not necessarily the 
same. Therefore only interest groups that openly support Israel in either their actions or 
statements were taken into account.    
  The third societal pressure is the media. This pressure was analyzed by looking at the 
most influential newspapers in Germany of that time (Crawford 1995, 9-10). The hypothesis H3) 
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that can be derived from this pressure is the more media coverage will be in favor of recognition 
the more likely elite support will be for recognition of a recognition-seeking state.  Dimitriu and 
de Graaf (2014) argue that, public opinion and the role the media play are closely linked. They 
argue that public opinion is shaped by the way opinion polls and especially the media coverage 
frame a certain issue (Dimitriu and De Graaf 2014, 7).   
 A final national level factor to take into account is the ideological dimension. This factor 
comes from an article about support for Israel in the US House of Representatives by Oldmixon 
et al. (2005). Oldmixon et al. found that in the US House of representatives a shift was taking 
place in support for Israel. A new cleavage was found on this particular issue. Left-wing liberals 
and African Americans started to identify themselves with the Palestinian cause, instead of an 
unquestionable support for Israel. By contrast, religious and ideological conservatives and right 
wing Republicans on the other hand identified themselves with Israel. In fact, Oldmixon et al. 
found that religious beliefs have become more important in explaining member’s positions on 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Oldmixon et al. 2005, 420). From this analysis it becomes clear 
that ideology and or religion matters in explaining support for Israel or Palestine. This thesis 
assumes that the findings of the American case can also be applied to the Western European 
cases. Ideology also matters in explaining why some European states recognize Palestine while 
others do not.  A hypothesis H4 that can be derived from this factor is: The more party ideology, 
of the parties in government, support recognition of recognition-seeking states the more likely a 
state will be in favor of recognition of a particular recognition-seeking state.  
International community level theoretical approach  
  Coggins' article takes another approach to explain why states recognize new member 
states into the international community. She argues that a new state’s acceptance in the 
international community, and therefore its legitimacy, is mainly based on the acceptance from 
its peers (Coggins 2011, 433). But the international community does not act as one unitary actor. 
Coggins makes the assumption that it is crucial in high status groups to be recognized by its 
members instead of mainly identifying oneself with the group. She takes the international 
community as one of these high status groups and treats the states as its members who decide 
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upon the recognition of new members. She compares it to the Greek fraternities in US colleges. 
Furthermore she assumes the Great Powers are the ones who have the most influence in the 
recognition process. Coggins mainly focuses on the Great Powers (which are according to her 
the UK, US, Russia, China, France, Germany, Italy and Japan), but she also argues that not all 
members have to recognize the newcomer before it can join the community (Coggins 2011, 448-
449). A hypothesis based on the aspect of legitimacy is H5) the more Palestine is integrated in 
international institutions and or organizations, the higher the likelihood that western European 
states will recognize Palestine. The logic behind this hypothesis is that more states will see 
Palestine as a legitimate state as it is increasingly recognized by international institutions. 
Furthermore it also reduces diplomatic costs, because states are able to argue that the 
recognition of Palestine is legitimate because Palestine is already a member of many 
international institutions. This is a fact that cannot be denied even by states like the United 
States and Germany that oppose unilateral Palestinian membership in the international 
community or organizations such as the World Zionist Organization (WZO) that lobby for the 
non-recognition of Palestine.  
 External interests can be a reason for states to recognize new member states. The logic 
behind this reason is that states first look at their own external security and interests when 
considering the recognition of, a new state. They can use recognition as a strategic policy to 
weaken their enemies and to strengthen their own position in the international community. It is 
also argued by Coggins that states are less likely to recognize a state that seeks independence 
from a friendly state, especially when the state and the home state have shared interests, but also 
when they have a shared ideology or shared (un)democratic values (Coggins 2011, 449-450). 
This is because the diplomatic costs of recognizing Palestine can be too high when there are 
good economic, military and political bilateral ties with Israel at stake.  A hypothesis that can be 
derived from this logic is: H6) the nature of bilateral ties with Israel will determine the 
willingness of Western European States to recognize Palestine.   
Operationalization section 
Case selection 
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  This paper takes the most similar system design approach to guide the case-selection. 
Therefore it is necessary to take cases that are similar in many aspects (Hague and Harrop 2010, 
50-51). This method is useful when the cases are similar but only differ in their outcome and 
certain independent variables. The selected cases for this paper are France, Germany, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. All states are western European states. All states are member of the 
European Union. Furthermore all these states have a parliamentary system in which 
accountability to the parliament by the government is essential. However the cases differ on the 
dependent variable (the recognition of Palestine). Sweden has officially recognized Palestine. 
France and the United Kingdom have symbolically recognized Palestine by parliamentary 
resolution. By contrast Germany has not made any official moves towards the recognition of 
Palestine. By analyzing these four states that have or have not recognized Palestine, it is possible 
to look at the specific reasons for recognition or non-recognition.  
Variables  
  The dependent variable, present in all the hypotheses is, the type of recognition of the 
recognition seeking state. It is a nominal variable divided, into three categories. Recognition of a 
state can be 1) formal recognition, 2) symbolic by parliamentary resolution, or 3) non-
recognition.  The evidence for this variable was found in the cases of France and the United 
Kingdom in the respective parliamentary resolutions (Assemblée Nationale 2014; Parliament.uk 
2014). The evidence in the case of Sweden and was found in official governmental statements 
(Wallström 2014). 
  The independent variables that can be derived from hypotheses H1 to H6 are 
respectively public opinion, presence of Palestinian interest groups, presence of Israeli interest 
groups, media coverage, party ideology of the incumbent government, integration into 
international organizations and institutions of the recognition-seeking state, and lastly the 
nature of bilateral ties.  The variables will be explained and operationalized in the next 
paragraphs.  
  This variable is analyzed by looking at opinion polls held in each of the cases. This paper 
focuses on the support for Israel or Palestine. And on the specific question of support for 
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recognition or opposing recognition. This is a continuous variable. Data was gathered from 
various sources. The cases are marked as 1) in favor of recognition when more than 50 percent of 
the respondents were in favor. 2) against recognition when more than 50% were against 
recognition and 3) not available when there was a lack of data. A problem with the different 
polls in the different cases is that they were not all conducted at the same time with the same 
questions. Questions may vary from whether or not Palestine should be recognized within the 
UN, as a formal state and on what side people were during the Israeli-Palestinian Gaza war of 
the summer of 2014. The oldest polls were conducted in the Swedish case. Therefore these 
opinion polls might not be completely accurate they also did not specifically cover the question 
of recognition of Palestine.  
  The presence of pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli  interest groups of influence in each of the 
western European cases can be seen as an independent variable. This is a nominal variable. The 
two factors that should be taken into account when identifying  interest groups are according to 
Rubenzer, organizational strength and the level of political activity (2008, 169).  The organization 
was coded as 1) organized, when the organization has an office in the capital and a regional 
office in each of the cases. If the organization does not comply with this condition they were 
coded as 2) unorganized. According to Rubenzer the literature on  interest groups is clear that 
“well-organized groups have both offices at the national level as well as regional outreach 
capability” (2008, 177). Therefore these groups will be able to influence policy whereas 
unorganized groups are less likely to have an influence. The other necessary condition is the 
level of political activity. Are the organizations able to mobilize their members around issues 
relating to either Palestine or Israel? A group was coded as 1) active when it is able to mobilize 
their members in for example mass-demonstrations, urge them to sign petitions or make public 
statements in the media. They were coded as 2) not active, when they do not meet these 
conditions. Both conditions are necessary according to Rubenzer. Therefore, only interest groups 
that comply with both conditions were taken into account. When interest groups do not meet 
these conditions or just one condition, they were not regarded as influential. Finally the cases 
will be put on an ordinal scale, on which they will be evaluated per case of the existence, 
number, and political activity of these interest groups. The scale has three categories 1) likely to 
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have influenced policy, 2) somewhat likely to have influenced policy, 3) not likely to have 
influenced policy. When there are more than two organizations well organized and politically 
active on the matter of recognition of Palestine they will be put in category 1, when there are 
two or less organizations well organized and politically active they will be put in category 2. 
Finally a case will be put in category 3 when there are no organizations present that were well 
organized and politically active.     
  The data sources for the media coverage variable were articles from two national 
newspapers in each of the cases, except for Sweden. Newspapers were selected by criteria as 
being of opposing political sides, broadsheet newspapers and daily circulation, and for the 
Swedish case a Swedish news website in English was used. For the United Kingdom, the Daily 
Telegraph and the Independent were chosen. Both newspapers are in the top ten of most read 
newspapers in the United Kingdom (Greenslade 2014). The Daily Telegraph is traditionally 
supportive of the Conservative Party while the Independent is supportive of the Liberal 
Democratic party4. For France Le Figaro and Le Monde were chosen. Both newspapers rank 1 
and 2 in the figures of the OJD for circulation (OJD 2014). Le Monde can be seen as a left-wing 
newspaper (L’OBS 2007). While Le Figaro can be seen as a right wing paper (Peralva and Macé 
2002, 36). For the German case the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Algemeiner 
Zeitung were selected. The Süddeutsche Zeitung is described as a center-left newspaper, while 
the Frankfurter Algemeiner Zeitung is described as a center-right newspaper (Spiegel Online 
Staff 2011). Both newspapers are the second and third biggest paper after the tabloid newspaper 
Bild Deutschland (Schröder 2014). Finally for the Swedish case an online news website, 
thelocal.se was selected (because of linguistic limitations).     
  Articles were selected through the websites of each newspaper, by searching their online 
archives using the search words “Palestine recognition”. The indicator that was used is the 
newspaper coverage of the recognition of Palestine. This is a nominal variable, newspaper 
articles were divided into three categories: 1) a Pro-Palestinian/critical of Israel standpoint, 2) 
                                                          
4 Originally the newspaper that is supportive of the Labour party, the Guardian was selected, but this 
newspaper’s articles were hard to access online, instead the Independent was chosen. 
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neutral standpoint of view and 3) Pro-Israel/critical of Palestine standpoint5. The level of 
analysis are the articles. Of each article each sentence was analyzed and categorized in one of the 
three categories. Then each article was given a final code: Pro Recognition/Palestinian, Against 
recognition/Pro Israel or Neutral. The time period of the articles was between September 2014 
and December 2014 because the first case of recognition took place on 13 October 2014 in Great 
Britain and the last by France on 11 December 2014. To measure if the media might have shaped 
public opinion and the opinion of political elites, it is therefore necessary to take newspaper 
articles that pre-date the first recognition until the last recognition.   
 
  The independent variable of the party ideology of the incumbent government helps to 
understand why a western European state chooses to recognize the Palestinian state or not. Left-
wing parties are traditionally more likely to support Palestine while the right-wing 
conservatives and religious parties are more likely to support Israel. Evidence for this has been 
found in the American case where left-wing democrats and liberals were more likely to support 
Palestine than religious and conservative Republicans. This variable is a nominal variable. Each 
party in the governments of the cases is placed into three categories 1) parties that have 
traditionally supported Palestinian nationalism 2) parties that have traditionally opposed 
unilateral recognition of Palestine without peace negotiations and 3) parties that traditionally 
have been neutral when it comes to Palestinian nationalism. The data for this variable will be 
derived from the party websites, platforms and manifestoes of each party.  
  The variable of Palestinian integration into international organizations and institutions is 
expected to serve as a control variable. Arguing that the recognition of Palestine is legitimate 
because it has already been recognized by a variety of international organizations and 
institutions reduces the diplomatic costs for all western European states that choose to recognize 
Palestine. Indicators that will be used are Palestine’s admission of a member of UNESCO, the 
Arab League, the Geneva Convention, the ICC, IBAN. Data sources are the different treaties that 
                                                          
5 The coding scheme that was used for analyzing the newspaper articles can be found in the annex. 
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Palestine intended to join and the member states lists of different institutions that Palestine has 
become a member state of over the past few years.  
  The independent variable of the nature of bilateral ties with Israel is an important 
background factor, because it takes into account the costs for western European states to 
formally recognize Palestine. Israel and western European states are known to have close 
bilateral ties. Indicators that can measure these relationships are bilateral weapon trades with 
Israel6, the economic ties between Israel and these European states7 and political ties measured 
by the amount of bilateral visits of heads of states and other members of government to Israel 
and vice versa. These indicators can be measured as an ordinal variable. Category 1 includes 
states with close bilateral ties with Israel on all three indicators, scoring highest on all indicators. 
Category 2 is composed of states that have somewhat close bilateral ties with Israel, scoring high 
on 1 or 2 indicators. Lastly category 3 comprises states that have less close bilateral ties with 
Israel, scoring lowest on all indicators. The expectation is that the states that fall into category 1 
are the least likely to recognize Palestine as an independent state, whereas states that fall into 
category 2 will be more likely to recognize Palestine symbolically and states that fall into 
category 3 are most likely to recognize Palestine officially.  
Research Method 
  For this paper the controlled comparison method will be used, more specifically the 
method of most similar system design. This method is useful when the cases are similar but only 
differ in the outcome and certain independent variables. This method however has some 
limitations. It is for example not possible to have cases that resemble each other perfectly in 
every respect (George and Bennett 2005, 151-153). But the cases in this thesis do resemble each 
other in different important aspects as for example all being western European states, all are 
member of the European Union and having a parliamentary system. It can be seen as a 
controlled comparison because the cases resemble each other have different outcomes. With this 
method it is possible to eliminate causes that are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for 
recognition of Palestine (George and Bennett 2005, 157). Using this method it is possible to 
                                                          
6 For this indicator, the weapon trade figures on the SIPRI websites will be used.  
7 See for Israel’s main European trade partners: http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/presentations/maz_nis_2013.pdf 
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answer the question of why some western European states choose to recognize Palestine while 
others do not, because it takes the logic that these states seem similar but differ in one aspect, 
namely the recognition of Palestine.  Furthermore this specific research method can help 
building a theory of recognition of states.  
 
Results 
 
Hypothesis 1 Public opinion 
France and the United Kingdom 
In 2011 the international polling bureau Globescan carried out a worldwide survey, at the 
request of the BBC, asking citizens of 19 countries worldwide whether or not they were in 
support of recognition of Palestine. In France, 54 percent were in favor of recognizing Palestine 
while 20 percent opposed recognition and 26 percent were indifferent. In the United Kingdom, 
53 percent were in favor while 26 percent opposed recognition and 21 percent were indifferent8. 
Since in both countries more than 50 percent was in favor of recognition both countries will be 
marked as 1), in favor of recognition.  
Germany 
The German polling bureau Forsa carried out opinion polls, at the request of the newspaper 
Stern, in both 2012 and 2015, on the question whether or not Germany should recognize 
Palestine officially. In 2012, 65 percent of the German public answered yes to this question, 
while 18 percent said no and 17 percent was not sure (Weber 2012). The same opinion poll was 
held in March 2015 among 1001 German citizens. In 2015, 71 percent of the German public was 
in favor of official recognition of Palestine, 15 percent was against, official recognition, and 14 
percent answered do not know (Mathes 2015). Due to the fact that an overwhelming majority, of 
Germans, was in favor of the recognition of Palestine. Germany will be marked as 1) in favor of 
recognition of Palestine.  
                                                          
8 In France 509 people were questioned and in the United Kingdom 1000 people were questioned 
(Mountford 2011). 
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Sweden 
In Sweden there have been no recent opinion polls on this particular matter. The most recent 
opinion poll dates from 2004. This poll asked whether the Swedish approved the behavior of the 
Israeli and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Swedish people disapproved the 
behavior of both parties. 83 percent disapproved Israel’s behavior and 83 percent also 
disapproved the behavior of the PLO (Bjereld 2005, 242). Because the questions asked in the 
opinion poll do not specifically cover the question of recognition of Palestine, Swedish public 
opinion will be marked as 3) not available. Although it acknowledges that more recent figures 
might show completely different results. 
Table 1.1  
Standpoint France Germany Sweden  United Kingdom 
1) In favor of 
Recognition 
X X  X 
2) Opposing 
recognition of 
Palestine 
    
3) Not Available    x  
 
  Table 1.1 shows the final conclusions with regard to the results of the different Public 
opinion polls held in the different countries. It shows that in three out of four cases the public 
opinion was in favor of recognition of Palestine. The public of France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom were largely in favor of recognition. Surprisingly, the Germans were most in favor of 
recognition in 2015 (71 percent). It is surprising because Germany did not recognize Palestine. 
One limitation is that the opinion poll held in Sweden might not be representative for the 
contemporary opinion of the Swedish public. The other cases clearly show that public opinion 
was in favor of recognition some years before the Gaza war of 2014. This supports the idea that 
the initiatives to recognize Palestine were pressured by the public opinion, and confirms 
hypothesis 1 in at least three out of the four cases.    
 
Hypothesis 2a: pro-Palestinian interest groups in France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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  For each case, two tables were made, one with the level of organization of the interest 
group and another table with the political activity of each interest group. In the first table the 
level of organization is described and whether or not the particular organizations are  interest 
groups or non-. The second table shows the level of political activity of each of the interest 
groups. From each organization, if available, the kind of activities are described. The 
second and last column reflects the political activity of each organization.9 The 
organizations coded as 1) can be seen as politically active, the organizations coded as 2) 
can be seen as not politically active and 3) is marked as non-available, since the 
organization does not have an available agenda or has no website at all. Finally the cases 
will be put on an ordinal scale, on which they will be evaluated per case of the existence, 
number, and political activity of these interest groups. The scale has three categories 1) 
likely to have influenced policy, 2) somewhat likely to have influenced policy, 3) not 
likely to have influenced policy.   
 
Pro-Palestinian interest groups 
  Table 2.1 shows the level of organization of pro-Palestinian interest groups in France. Six 
organizations can be marked as organized. The Association France Palestine Solidarité, CAPJPO – 
Europalestine, Platforme des ONG Françaises pour la Palestine, CBSP, UJFP and Les Amis d’ Al 
Rowwad. These organizations both have an office in the capital of France and have several 
regional offices.  
Table 2.1 France Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Level of Organization 
1) organized, 2) un-
organized 
Association 
France 
Palestine 
Yes  Yes  1 
                                                          
9 All the sources and websites for all organizations are categorized by case and in alphabetical order can be found in 
Annex 1.  
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Solidarité 
CCIPPP 
(protection 
Palestine) 
No  No 2 
CAPJPO - 
Europalestin
e 
Yes Yes 1 
Platforme 
des ONG 
Françaises 
Pour La 
Palestine 
Yes Yes 1 
AURDIP  Yes No  2 
Génération 
Palestine 
Yes  No  2 
CICUP  Yes No 2 
CBSP Yes Yes 1 
CVPR-PO  Yes  No  2 
Amani  No  No  2 
Union Juive 
Française 
pour la Paix 
(UJFP) 
Yes Yes  1 
Les Amis 
d’Al 
Rowwad 
Yes Yes  1 
 
  The table below shows the degree of political activity of each pro-Palestinian interest 
group. Four organizations can be seen as politically active. They organized debates, wrote open 
letters to lawmakers, petitions and other mobilizing activities during the parliamentary debates. 
The Association France Palestine Solidarité, CAPJPO-Europalestine, Platforme des ONG Françaises 
pour la Palestine and the Union Juive Françaises Pour la Paix are therefore marked as politically 
active. While some others have no available information about their activities in the period 
between September 2014 and December 2014. These organizations were therefore marked as 3) 
not available.  
Table 2.2 France Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of political activity   
Name Organized manifestations and or protests or any 
political activity related to the recognition of 
Palestine in the period september – December 
2014 
Politically active 1) 
yes, 
2) no or 3) Not 
Available 
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Association 
France Palestine 
Solidarité 
Yes (many activities, including debates) 1 
CCIPPP 
(protection 
Palestine) 
No (only articles placed on the website, directly 
copied from other sites) 
2 
CAPJPO - 
Europalestine 
Yes (many activities, debates, demonstrations and 
manifestations) 
1 
Platforme des 
ONG Françaises 
Pour La 
Palestine  
Yes (some open letters to the president and 
several petitions to (European) lawmakers) 
1 
AURDIP  Yes (an open letter to the president but no real 
manifestations) 
2 
Génération 
Palestine 
N/A 3 
CICUP  N/A 3 
CBSP No (some articles on recognition placed on the 
website directly copied from other sites) 
2 
CVPR-PO  N/A 3 
Amani  No  2 
Union Juive 
Française pour 
la Paix (UJFP) 
Yes (many activities) 1 
Les Amis d’Al 
Rowwad 
No  2 
 
  Only four pro-Palestinian organizations qualify for both the condition of political activity 
and organized group. One organization can be seen as a Palestinian ethnic organization: the 
Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP). This organization however is not 
politically active. The CBSP is mainly focused on helping people in Gaza and the Westbank. The 
four organizations that did meet the requirements are the Association France Palestine Solidarité, 
CAPJPO- EuroPalestine, Platforme des ONG Françaises Pour La Palestine and the Union Juive 
Française pour la Paix (UJFP). This last organization is in fact a Jewish organization that is in favor 
of peace in the Middle-East and for an open dialogue with the Palestinians. These four 
organizations have possibly influenced lawmakers in Paris to vote in favor of the resolution. 
Since there are more than two organizations both well organized and politically active the 
organizations in France fall into category 1), of more likely to have influenced policy makers. 
Therefore hypothesis 2a has to be confirmed for the case of France.  
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Pro-Palestinian interest groups in Germany 
  Table 2.3 gives an overview of the pro-Palestinian interests groups that are active in 
Germany. There are less organizations active in Germany than in France. Only one active 
organization can be marked as organized. Most websites of these interest groups are outdated 
and do not give any indication of sustained political activity. The organization that was 
organized is the Deutsch-Palästinensische Gesellschaft. Even though most of the organizations do 
not have an office in Berlin they often do have regional offices in Germany. 
 
Table 2.3 Germany Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office 
in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Level of Organization 
1) organized, 2) un-
organized 
DINO No Yes (one in 
Münster) 
2 
 
 
Palästina Portal No Yes (in 
Dortmund) 
2 
Palästinensische 
Gemeinde 
Deutschland 
Falastin 
No No 2 
Deutscher 
Koordinationskreis 
Palästina Israel 
Yes No 2 
Deutsch-
Palästinensische 
Gesellschaft 
Yes Yes 1 
Genfer Initiative No Yes (one in 
Munich) 
2 
Uri Avnery No Yes (one in 
Osnabrück) 
2 
 
Table 2.4 shows the political activity of the different pro-Palestinian interest groups in Germany. 
Only one out of seven interest groups can be seen as politically active, the Genfer Initiative. This 
organization has put some statements on recognition and some interviews on their website on 
recognition in the other European cases. However all the other organizations do not have 
statements on the recognition of Palestine by the other states. Some do have general news 
24 
 
articles but most organizations do not even mention the recognition at all, let alone that they are 
politically active on the subject.    
Table 2.4 Germany Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of political activity   
Name Organized manifestations and or 
protests or any political activity related 
to the recognition of Palestine in the 
period september – December 2014 
Politically active for the recognition 
of Palestine 1) yes, 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
DINO No 2 
Palästina Portal No  2 
Palästinensische 
Gemeinde 
Deutschland 
Falastin 
No  2 
Deutscher 
Koordinationskreis 
Palästina Israel 
No 2 
Deutsch-
Palästinensische 
Gesellschaft 
No 2 
Genfer Initiative Yes, some interviews and declarations 
on the recognition of Palestine 
1 
Uri Avnery No 2 
 
  In Germany no  interest group meets both the condition of the level of organization and 
the condition of political activity. Only one organization, the Deutsch-Palästinensische Gesellschaft, 
meets the condition of a well-organized, and one organization, the Genfer Initiative, can be seen 
as politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine. Since no organization meets both 
conditions the pro-Palestinian organizations in Germany will be put in category 3) of not likely 
to have influenced policymakers.  Therefore it cannot be argued that one of these organizations 
has tried and has been able to influence the German policy on the recognition of Palestine. 
Hypothesis 2a has to be rejected for the case of Germany.  
Pro-Palestinian Interest groups in Sweden  
  Table 2.5 gives an overview of the Swedish Pro-Palestinian interest groups. In Sweden 
there are less pro-Palestinian interest groups, but they are far more organized.  For example, 
they have up to date websites. A lot of smaller interest groups have united themselves in 
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Palestinagrupperna I Sverige. In Sweden two out of three organizations can be seen as well-
organized. They both have an office in Stockholm and different regional offices.   
Table 2.5 Sweden Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office 
in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Level of Organization 
1) organized, 2) un-
organized 
Palestinagrupperna 
I Sverige 
Yes Yes 1 
Isolera Israel Yes Yes 1 
Ship to Gaza 
Sverige 
Yes Yes 1 
 
  Table 2.6 shows that two out of three interest groups are politically active. The 
organizations have sent letters to parties and candidates before the elections asking them to 
speak out for the official recognition of Palestine. The Palestinagrupperna I Sverige is a very 
politically active interest group. It is the most well-known pro-Palestinian organization of 
Sweden.  
Table 2.6 Sweden Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of political activity   
Name Organized manifestations and or protests or any 
political activity related to the recognition of 
Palestine in the period september – December 
2014 
Politically active 1) yes, 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
Palestinagrup
perna i 
Sverige  
Yes, the organization sent letters to parties and 
candidates before the elections, organized 
demonstrations and placed articles on the 
recognition by Sweden  
1 
Isolera Israel No, one article on the recognition by the 
Swedish government  
2 
Ship to Gaza 
Sverige 
Yes, several articles on their website stating they 
tried to move parties in the new government to 
recognize Palestine 
1 
 
 In Sweden two interest groups meet both of the conditions of well-organized and the 
political activity, the Ship to Gaza Sverige interest group and the Palestinagrupperna I Sverige. This 
last organization can be seen as an umbrella-organization, in which other smaller organizations 
are united, and the organization has at least 14 regional groups. This organization has tried to 
influence politicians directly, by sending them letters. The organization has also published the 
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answers of these parties and candidates on their websites and tried to hold them accountable for 
their answers. Sweden falls into category 2 of cases where interest groups have probably been 
somewhat able to influence policy on recognition of Palestine. Therefore hypothesis 2a has to be 
confirmed for the case of Sweden.  
 
Pro-Palestinian Interest groups in the United Kingdom 
 
 Table 2.7 gives an overview of the interest groups in the United Kingdom. Two out of six 
organizations can be qualified as organized. The Palestine Solidarity campaign and the Friends 
of Al Aqsa. Both organizations have offices in London and several regional offices. The Palestine 
Solidarity Campaign is an UK-based interest group with active branches in other countries as 
well. Friends of Al-Aqsa states on their website that they try to put pressure on British 
lawmakers to make Israel respect international laws and regulations vis-à-vis the Palestinians. 
The Friends of Al-Aqsa is an ethnic organization, it focuses primarily on Islamic grass-root 
support.   
 
Table 2.7 UK Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Level of Organization 
1) organized, 2) un-
organized 
Palestine 
Solidarity 
Campaign 
yes Yes 1 
Palestine 
Forum in 
Britain 
Yes No 2 
Advancing 
Arab-British 
Relations 
Yes No 2 
Friends of Al 
Aqsa 
Yes Yes 1 
Friends of 
Sabeel UK 
No Yes (one 
in 
Oxford) 
2 
Jews for 
Justice  for 
Yes  No 2 
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Palestinians  
 
Table 2.8 shows the level of political activity of the pro-Palestinian interest groups in the United 
Kingdom between September 2014 and December 2014. It appears that the majority of the 
interest groups in the United Kingdom have been politically active on the subject of recognition 
of Palestine. Most  interest groups urged their members to ask their MPs to vote in favor of the 
resolution for recognition of Palestine. Some organizations have also organized a lobby event at 
Westminster, to influence politicians directly. Out of the six organizations, four can be 
characterized as politically active, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Palestine Forum in Britain, 
Advancing Arab-British Relations and Friends of Al-Aqsa.  
 
Table 2.8 UK Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of political activity   
Name Organized manifestations and or protests 
or any political activity related to the 
recognition of Palestine in the period 
september – December 2014 
Politically active 1) yes, 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
Palestine 
Solidarity 
Campaign 
Yes, this organization has urged its 
members to ask their MPs to vote in favor 
of recognition, organized a lobby event at 
Westminster and placed several pro-
Palestinian articles and placed a list of 
MPs that voted in favor of the resolution 
1 
Palestine 
Forum in 
Britain 
Yes, this organization participated in the 
lobby event at Westminster 
1 
Advancing 
Arab-British 
Relations 
Yes, this organization asked its members 
to ask their MPs to vote in favor of the 
resolution for recognition of Palestine 
1 
Friends of Al 
Aqsa 
Yes, this organization has urged its 
members to ask their MPs to vote in favor 
of recognition, and placed several pro-
Palestinian articles 
1 
Friends of 
Sabeel UK 
No 2 
Jews for 
Justice for 
Palestinians  
No 2 
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  In the United Kingdom there are two interest groups that comply with both conditions. 
The first is the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign and the second is the Friends of Al Aqsa, which 
is an  interest group. The United Kingdom, therefore falls into the second category of cases 
where interest groups probably have somewhat been able to influence policymakers. 
Hypothesis 2a has to be confirmed for the case of the United Kingdom. 
 
Hypothesis 2 b pro-Israeli interest groups in France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
 
Pro-Israeli interest groups in France 
 
  To give an overview of the pro-Israeli interest groups tables 2.9 to 2.16 were made. Each 
case has both a table for the level of organization of the interest groups and a table for their level 
of political activity. The cases are listed in alphabetical order. The tables have the same lay-out 
as the tables for pro-Palestinian interest group. In the level of organization, the groups were 
evaluated on the basis of having an office in the capital and for having regional offices. 
Furthermore they were evaluated for whether or not they are openly in support of Israel. The 
last column gives the conclusion of each interest groups’ level of organization. The political 
activity tables give an overview of each interest groups’ political activities during the period of 
the parliamentary debates and the decision to officially recognize Palestine by Sweden between 
September 2014 and December 2014. In the last column each organization was marked for being 
political active on the recognition of Palestine. 
 
  Table 2.9 shows the pro-Israeli interest groups’ level of organization in France. Five  
organizations were marked as well-organized. The CRIF, Union des Étudiants Juifs de France, 
L’Agence Juive pour Israël, Association France-Israël and the KKL France all have offices in Paris and 
one or more regional offices. Furthermore all but one organization are openly in support of 
Israel.   
Table 2.9 France pro-Israel interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Openly in 
support of 
Israel 
Level of organization 
1) organized , 2) un-
organized 
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CRIF Yes  Yes  Yes  1 
Bureau 
Nationale de 
Vigilance 
Contre 
l’Antisemitisme 
No Yes (one in 
Drancy) 
Not clear 2 
Union des 
Étudiants Juifs 
de France 
Yes Yes yes 1 
L’Agence Juive 
pour Israël 
Yes Yes  (one in 
Marseile) 
yes 1 
Association 
France-Israël 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Alliance 
Israélite 
Universelle 
Yes No  yes 2 
KKL de France Yes Yes Yes 1 
 
 Table 2.10 shows the level of political activity of the pro-Israeli organizations, and the 
kind of activities the organizations led. Three organizations can be marked as politically active. 
These organizations are the CRIF, Bureau Nationale de Vigilance Contre l’Antisemitisme and the 
Association France-Israël. Representatives from the CRIF have regularly appeared on national 
television, given some other media statements. They also placed several articles on the 
recognition of Palestine on their website. The Bureau Nationale de Vigilance Contre l ‘Antisemitisme 
asked their members to show up at a manifestation that was being organized in front of the 
National Assembly in Paris. The Association France-Israël sent letters to senators and other 
politicians to ask them to vote against the recognition resolution, they also places several articles 
on their website.     
Table 2.10 France pro-Israel interest groups’ level of political activity  
Name Organized manifestations and or protests or any 
political activity related to the recognition of Palestine 
in the period september – December 2014 
Politically active 1) yes, 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
CRIF Yes, several TV appearances, media statements and 
articles on their website 
1 
Bureau 
Nationale de 
Vigilance 
Contre 
l’Antisemitisme 
Yes, this organization has asked its followers to show 
up at the manifestation in front of the National 
Assembly in Paris 
1 
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Union des 
Étudiants Juifs 
de France 
No 2 
L’Agence Juive 
pour Israël 
No 2 
Association 
France-Israël 
Yes, the organization sent letters to the Senate, and 
placed several articles on its website 
1 
Alliance 
Israélite 
Universelle 
No  2 
KKL de France No 2 
 
In France, the  interest groups mostly appear to be well-organized, but only CRIF and 
Association France-Israël meet both the requirements of the level of organization and the level of 
political activity. The pro-Israel groups in France therefore fall into the second category of 
somewhat influential. It is possible that in France the lawmakers in parliament have been 
influenced by the activities of these two  interest groups. Therefore hypothesis 2b has to be 
confirmed for the case of France.  
 
Pro-Israeli interest groups in Germany 
  Table 2.11 gives an overview of German pro-Israeli interest groups. In Germany four 
organizations out of six can be marked as well-organized. These organizations have both an 
office in Berlin and one or more in other regions of the country. All six organizations are openly 
in support of the state of Israel.   
 
Table 2.11 Germany pro-Israel interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Openly in 
support of 
Israel 
Level of organization 
1) organized , 2) un-
organized 
Keren 
Hayesod 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
WIZO 
Deutschland 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Jüdische 
Nationalfonds 
E.V. KKL 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Jewish 
Agency for 
Israel 
No Yes (one in 
Köln)  
Yes 2 
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Germany 
DKR No Yes (one in 
Bad 
Nauheim) 
Yes 2 
Deutsche-
Israelische 
Gesellschaft 
E.V. 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
 
 Table 2.12 shows the level of activity of pro-Israel interest groups in Germany. No pro-
Israeli organization active in Germany has organized any political activities in the period 
between September 2014 and December 2014. Therefore none of the organizations has been 
marked as politically active on the matter of the recognition of Palestine.  
Table 2.12 Germany pro-Israel interest groups’ level of political activity  
Name Organized manifestations and or protests or 
any political activity related to the recognition 
of Palestine in the period september – 
December 2014 
Politically active against the 
recognition of Palestine 1) yes, 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
Keren Hayesod No 2 
WIZO 
Deutschland 
No 2 
Jüdische 
Nationalfonds 
E.V. KKL 
No 2 
Jewish Agency 
for Israel 
Germany 
No 2 
DKR No 2 
Deutsche- 
Israelische 
Gesellschaft 
E.V. 
No 2 
 
  In Germany no interest group complies with both conditions. Although most German 
pro-Israeli interest groups are well organized, none of them have been politically active on the 
matter of recognition of Palestine (or non-recognition). Therefore Germany’s pro-Israel groups 
fall into the third category of not influential. Hypothesis 2b needs to be rejected for the case of 
Germany.  
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Pro-Israeli interest groups in Sweden 
  In Sweden there are several pro-Israeli organizations, but most cannot be categorized as 
well-organized. Only the Samfundet Sverige Israel can be seen as organized. Most organizations 
have an office in Stockholm but do not have offices in other regions of the country. Furthermore 
only two organizations qualify as  organizations. Some organizations did not have specific 
information about the location of their head office or regional offices. These organizations were 
therefore marked as 3) unknown. All the organizations are open in their support of the state of 
Israel.     
 
Table 2.13 Sweden pro-Israel interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Openly in 
support of 
Israel 
Level of 
organization 
1) organized , 
2) un-
organized 
3) unknown 
Samfundet 
Sverige Israel 
Yes Yes Yes 1 
Sionistika 
Federationen I 
Sverige 
Yes  No Yes  2 
Stoppa 
Bojkott 
Unknown Unknown Yes  3 
Keren 
Hayesod 
Sverige 
Yes No Yes 2 
Fred I 
Mellanöstern 
Unknown Unknown Yes 3 
Swedish Israel 
Information 
Center 
Yes No Yes 2 
 
The level of political activity of the interest groups in Sweden is reflected in table 2.14. 
Almost all organizations are marked as politically active. Only the Fred i Mellanöstern has not 
been politically active. The Sionistika Federationen i Sverige, Stoppa Bojkott and Keren Hayesod 
Sverige have jointly organized pro-Israel rallies against the recognition of Palestine by the 
Swedish government in Stockholm. The Samfundet Sverige Israel and Swedish Israel Information 
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Centre have placed articles and media statements on their websites condemning the unilateral 
recognition by the Swedish government.  
Table 2.14 Sweden pro-Israel interest groups’ level of political activity  
Name Organized manifestations and or protests or 
any political activity related to the recognition 
of Palestine in the period september – 
December 2014 
Politically active 1) yes, 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
Samfundet 
Sverige Israel 
Yes, spokesmen of this organization have 
condemned the recognition by the Swedish 
government 
1 
Sionistika 
Federationen I 
Sverige 
Yes this organization organized rallies in 
cooperation with Stoppa Bojkott and Keren 
Hayesod Sverige 
1 
Stoppa Bojkott Yes this organization organized rallies in 
cooperation with Sionistike Federationen and 
Keren Hayesod 
1 
Keren Hayesod 
Sverige 
Yes this organization organized rallies in 
cooperation with Sionistika Federationen and 
Stoppa Bojkott 
1 
Fred i 
Mellanöstern 
No 2 
Swedish Israel 
Information 
Center 
A few critical articles on their website written 
by the head editor, condemning the unilateral 
recognition (Abramowicz 2014) 
1 
 
 In Sweden only one pro-Israel interest group complies with both conditions of being 
well-organized and being politically active. Even though almost all organizations were 
politically active, and tried to influence the government only one pro-Israel interest group, in 
Sweden, complies with both conditions of being well-organized and being politically active. 
Sweden falls into the second category of somewhat influential, because the Samfundet Sverige 
Israel complied with both conditions hypothesis 2b has to be confirmed for Sweden.  
Pro-Israeli interest groups in the United Kingdom 
 Table 2.15 shows the pro-Israel interest groups in the United Kingdom. All of the 
organizations are openly in support of Israel. Only two organizations are marked as well-
organized, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) both have 
offices in London and one or more regional offices. The Board of Deputies of British Jews states 
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that they speak for the majority of Jews living in Great Britain (Board of Deputies of British Jews 
2015). The JNF is very open in its support of the state of Israel, their motto being “Supporting 
Israel for Life” (JNF 2015).  
 
Table 2.15 United Kingdom pro-Israel interest groups’ level of organization 
Name Office in 
capital 
Regional 
offices 
Openly in 
support of 
Israel 
Level of 
organization 
1) organized , 
2) un-
organized 
Board of 
Deputies of 
British Jews 
Yes Yes Yes  1 
BICOM Yes No Yes  2 
Zionist 
Federation of 
Great Britain 
and Ireland 
Yes No  Yes 2 
JNF Yes Yes  Yes  1 
BICPAC Yes No  Yes  2 
Jewish 
Leadership 
Council 
Yes No Yes  2 
 
Table 2.16 shows the political activity of the pro-Israeli  interest groups in the United 
Kingdom. Four out of six organizations can be marked as politically active on the matter of 
recognition of Palestine. The Board of Deputies of British Jews publicized several statements 
criticizing the parliamentary resolution in the House of Commons. The Zionist Federation of 
Great Britain and Ireland organized what they called an “emergency lobby” at Westminster in 
London in September 2014 to influence lawmakers directly. The BICPAC organized a rally at 10, 
Downing Street to protest against the resolution. Finally the Jewish Leadership Council asked 
their members and supporters to send e-mails and letters to their MPs to vote against the 
parliamentary resolution in the House of Commons. To help their members and supporters they 
placed a sample letter that their followers could send to the MP of their local constituency.   
Table 2.16 United Kingdom pro-Israel interest groups’ level of political activity  
Name Organized manifestations and or protests or Politically active 1) yes, 
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any political activity related to the recognition 
of Palestine in the period september – 
December 2014 
2) no or 3) Not Available 
Board of 
Deputies of 
British Jews 
Yes, the organization has publicized 
statements criticizing the parliamentary 
resolution  
1 
BICOM No 2 
Zionist 
Federation of 
Great Britain 
and Ireland 
Yes, this interest group organized an 
“emergency lobby” in September 2014 and 
placed several articles on the recognition of 
Palestine 
1 
JNF No 2 
BICPAC Yes this organization organized a rally at 
Downing street against the recognition of 
Palestine 
1 
Jewish 
Leadership 
Council 
Yes, the organization urged its members to 
contact their MPs to vote against recognition 
of Palestine and placed a sample letter on 
their website 
1 
 
  In the United Kingdom, the Board of Deputies of British Jews is the only organization 
that can be marked as both well-organized and politically active. The other organizations are 
either not politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine or not well-organized. The 
United Kingdom falls into the second category of somewhat influential because the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews has possibly tried to influence lawmakers in British parliament. 
Therefore hypothesis 2b has to be confirmed for the case of the United Kingdom.  
 
Acceptance of hypothesis 2a for the cases of France, Sweden and UK 
  In conclusion hypothesis 2a cannot be rejected for the cases of France, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. This means that in these cases there has been pressure of interest groups at the 
domestic level of political elites. These elites have possibly been influenced by different pro-
Palestinian interest groups. An interesting finding is in the case of France where a Jewish 
organization tried to influence the political elites of France to vote in favor of recognition of 
France. In Sweden there was one central umbrella organization in which many smaller 
organizations were united with many regional offices and about thousand active members 
(Palestinagrupperna I Sverige 2012). Furthermore in some of the cases the political systems are 
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more open to lobbying than other systems. For example in Great Britain lobbying has been 
regulated by law, while in France, Germany and Sweden this is not the case (AALEP 2015). 
  
Acceptance of hypothesis 2b for the cases of France, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
  In three out of the four cases the hypothesis has to be accepted. In France, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom interest groups have possibly put pressure on the governments and 
members of parliament to keep the status quo of non-recognition of Palestine. In Germany 
however there was no organization that has tried to influence lawmakers, the hypothesis has to 
be rejected for Germany. This can be explained by the fact that recognition of Palestine was not 
an issue in Germany, because no interest group had to put the national government or members 
of parliament under pressure to vote against recognition.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3 Media Coverage 
  The results of the hypothesis of media coverage have been divided in four subsections, 
each subsection contains tables with the results of the coding of the newspaper articles on 
international recognition of Palestine. Each table has three categories: Pro 
recognition/Palestinian, Against Recognition/Pro Israel and the last is a Neutral category. In the 
last column the total number of analyzed articles is mentioned. Each article was first marked per 
sentence red when the sentence reflected a position against recognition of Palestine and in 
defense of Israel, green when the sentence reflected a position in support of recognition and 
criticizing Israel or yellow when the sentence was neutral. The specific words on which the 
coding was based can be found in the coding scheme in the annex10. After the article had been 
marked per sentence it was analyzed again and when most of the sentences where red the whole 
article was marked as Against Recognition, when most of the sentences were green it was 
marked Pro Recognition  and when most sentences were yellow it was marked as Neutral.  
                                                          
10 A document with all the analyzed articles of all four cases can be found on: 
https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B7YA9g1rJMb6fnFuVkNpZktoQl9oZ09YS09mc012WE05ZUQxXzhhWC1YV
Up4YkxsNzB5aFE&usp=sharing.  
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France 
  As mentioned before Le Figaro can be seen as a French right-wing newspaper, and 
aligned with the UMP party. In parliament this party voted mainly against the resolution for 
recognition of Palestine (Leduc 2014). Most of the articles in Le Figaro on the recognition of 
Palestine can be seen as neutral.  Out of a total of fifteen articles on the issue, eight articles were 
marked as neutral. While four were marked as having a pro-recognition standpoint, three were 
marked as against recognition. The articles in Le Monde were predominantly pro-recognition and 
pro-Palestinian. Eleven out of the twenty articles were coded as pro-Palestinian, eight articles 
were marked as neutral and one was marked as against recognition and pro-Israel.  
Table 3.1 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in Le Figaro 
Le Figaro Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral  Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel  
Total number of 
articles 
 4 8 3 15 
 
Table 3.2 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in Le Monde 
Le Monde Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel 
Total number of 
articles 
 11 8 1  20  
 
 
 
 
Germany 
  The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung had a total of eleven articles on the recognition of 
Palestine. Of these eleven articles, three were coded as pro-recognition, five as neutral and three 
against recognition. The coverage of recognition of Palestine by the Suddeutsche Zeitung has been 
predominantly neutral. The number of analyzed articles of the center-right Frankfurter 
Algemeiner Zeitung was thirteen. Four articles were coded as pro-recognition and pro-
Palestinian, three as neutral and a majority of six articles were coded as against recognition and 
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pro-Israel. It can be argued that the coverage of the Frankfurter Algemeiner Zeitung has been 
predominantly against the recognition of Palestine and pro-Israel.  
Table 3.3 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in the Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel 
Total number of 
articles 
 3 5 3 11 
 
Table 3.4 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in the Frankfurter Algemeiner Zeitung 
Frankfurter 
Algemeiner Zeitung 
Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel 
Total number of 
articles 
 4  3 6  13 
 
Sweden 
For the Swedish case only one news source was selected. The news website The Local.se 
had a total of eleven articles on the recognition of Palestine. Five articles were coded as pro-
recognition and pro-Palestinian while three were coded as neutral and three as against 
recognition and pro-Israel. It can be concluded that the majority of the articles of The Local.se 
were pro-Palestinian.  
 
Table 3.5 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in The Local.se 
The Local.se Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel 
Total number of 
articles 
 5 3 3 11 
 
United Kingdom 
  In the United Kingdom, articles on recognition of two newspapers were selected from 
the right-wing and Conservative Party aligned The Daily Telegraph and the more center-left The 
Independent. The Daily Telegraph had a total of eight articles on the recognition of Palestine. Six 
articles were coded as pro-recognition, two as neutral and none as against recognition. The 
majority of articles were pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian. The articles that were selected 
from The Independent were also predominantly pro-recognition. Thirteen out of a total of twenty 
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articles were marked as pro-recognition, one as neutral and six as against recognition and pro-
Israel.  
Tabl3 3.6 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in The Daily Telegraph 
The Daily Telegraph Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel 
Total number of 
articles 
 6 2 0 8 
 
Table 3.7 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in The Independent  
The Independent Pro-
recognition/Palestinian 
Neutral Against 
recognition/ Pro-
Israel 
Total number of 
articles 
 13 1 6 20 
 
  The politically left aligned Le Monde’s coverage of the recognition of Palestine was 
predominantly pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian. This can be explained by the fact that the 
newspaper traditionally takes the standpoint of the Parti Socialiste. In the case of Palestine, they 
were in favor of recognition. While Le Figaro is politically right-wing and aligns with more right-
wing parties like UMP, the coverage of the recognition of Palestine by Le Figaro was 
predominantly neutral. This can possibly explained by the fact that a majority of the French 
public was in favor of recognition while the right-wing parties were against. By taking a more 
neutral point of view, the newspaper was perhaps able to appeal to both audiences.   
  The politically center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung took a neutral point of view on the 
recognition of Palestine. This can possibly have the same explanation as for Le Figaro. Because in 
Germany the political elite was against recognition while the public was mainly in favor of 
recognition of a Palestinian state. The politically center-right Frankfurter Algemeiner Zeitung’s 
articles were predominantly against recognition of Palestine and pro-Israel. This can be 
explained by the fact that the political elites of Germany, including right wing parties were 
against recognition and a newspaper that is politically linked to right wing parties would be 
expected to reflect this in their articles.  
  The articles of the Swedish news website The Local.se were predominantly in favor of 
recognition of Palestine. This can be explained by the fact that media coverage can reflect the 
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public opinion of the Swedish people and therefore trying to influence the political elites.  
  In the United Kingdom it was surprising to see that both newspapers’ articles were 
predominantly pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian, because the Conservative Party was 
officially against official recognition. It would be expected that as in the French case the 
newspaper that is politically linked to the party would reflect their point of view. But this has 
not been the case, perhaps because some Conservative party members were also in favor of 
recognition, and the conservative party members had a free vote on the resolution (BBC UK 
Politics 2014).  
  In sum the evaluation of the media coverage hypothesis holds mixed results across the 
cases. For the cases of France and the United Kingdom it can be partly accepted, for Sweden it 
has to be fully accepted and rejected for the case of Germany where public opinion and media 
coverage did not overlap at all.  
 
Hypothesis 4 Party ideology  
  For the party ideology hypothesis, each case has its own table. The tables give a quick  
overview of each of the parties’ standpoints regarding Palestine and Israel. While analyzing the 
party manifestoes, a checklist with the possible solutions the political parties could have  to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was used. These possible solutions are shown in the first column of 
each table. In the second column the name of the incumbent parties are listed. Each row reflects 
the possible answers of the political party to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The parties were 
marked for the answers that were given in their party manifesto.  
France 
  The resolution on recognition of Palestine was adopted in the French Assemblée on 20 
November 2014. It was initiated by the incumbent Parti Socialiste (PS) (Equy 2014). It was 
adopted by 339 votes in favor of the resolution and 151 against (Siraud, 2014).   
Table 4.1: Parti Socialiste standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel 
Possible party answers to the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict 
Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party) 
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according to Party manifesto 
Unilateral recognition of a 
Palestinian state 
0 
Coexisting of Israel and a 
viable Palestinian state 
X 
Recognition after peace 
negotiations 
0 
Multilateral cooperation in 
achieving a two-state solution  
0 
Condemning of Israel X 
Condemning of Palestinian 
Authority/Hamas 
0 
Right of Israel to exist X 
 
  The PS party manifesto of 2012 has a small paragraph on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The party argues that for PS it is clear that Israel has the right to exist peacefully alongside a 
viable Palestinian state. Israel should stop the blockade of the Gaza strip and should stop the 
colonization of Palestinian lands. Because these actions are in violation of international law and 
resolutions of both the UN and the EU. France should also encourage and facilitate peace 
initiatives for a sustainable peace (Parti Socialiste manifesto 2012, 18). This standpoint seems to 
condemn Israel more than that it calls upon Palestine, because it calls upon Israel to remove the 
blockade and stop colonization. While at the same time it calls upon a viable state for Palestine, 
but does not really condemn Palestinians. However this party manifesto does not mention their 
position on recognizing Palestine. But on their website the PS states that the party has been in 
favor of recognition of Palestine since it adopted this standpoint in 2011 (Parti Socialiste 2014).  
Germany  
 
  Germany has a coalition government of three parties, the CSU (Christian Social Party), 
CDU (Christian Democratic party) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party). Officially there are 
three parties but the CSU and CDU are united in the same faction in the German parliament and 
they share a website and party manifesto (CDUCSU.de 2013). Because there has been no 
parliamentary or governmental move to recognize Palestine it is not necessary to take into 
account more parties than the coalition parties.  
42 
 
Table 4.2 CDU/CSU and SPD standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel 
Possible party answers to the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict 
according to Party manifesto 
CDU/CSU (Christian 
democratic party) 
SPD (social democratic party) 
Unilateral recognition of a 
Palestinian state 
0 0 
Coexisting of Israel and a 
viable Palestinian state 
0 0 
Recognition after peace 
negotiations 
0 0 
Multilateral cooperation in 
achieving a two-state solution  
0 X 
Condemning of Israel 0 0 
Condemning of Palestinian 
Authority/Hamas 
0 0 
Right of Israel to exist X 0 
 
  According to its party manifesto, the SPD sees itself as a pro-diplomacy party. It 
strongly stresses that Germany’s position in international politics should be in 
cooperation with other states. It explicitly stresses that Germany should not work on its 
own in foreign policy, but together with their European counterparts and in 
transatlantic alliances. One could argue that this statement of the SPD specifically rules 
out support of the SPD for the unilateral recognition of Palestine by Germany. The 
manifesto argues furthermore that Germany should work together with other states to 
solve international crises and conflicts in the Middle-East and Afghanistan (SPD 
manifesto 2012, 107).  
  The CDU-CSU manifesto has a small paragraph dedicated to “Germany’s special 
responsibility regarding the state of Israel” (CDU/CSU manifesto 2013, 74). The party 
argues that Germany has a special responsibility towards Israel as a Jewish state. The 
right of Israel to exist and its security are of vital interest to Germany and the CDU-CSU. 
The party argues furthermore that both Germany and Europe have high interests in 
achieving peace and stability in the Middle East. CDU-CSU is in favor of a two-state 
solution, with a secure Israel with settled borders and a viable Palestinian state that both 
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coexist in peace (CDUCSU manifesto 2013, 74).   
 
Sweden 
  In Sweden, the incumbent government urged to recognize Palestine officially within 
several weeks after its installation. In the government coalition, two parties are represented. 
These parties are the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) and the Social Democrats (Social 
Demokraterna).  
Table 4.3 Social Demokraterna and Miljöpartiet de Gröna standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel 
Possible party answers to the 
Palestinian/Israeli conflict 
according to Party manifesto 
Social Democratic Party (Social 
Demokraterna) 
 
Green Party (Miljöpartiet de 
Gröna) 
 
Unilateral recognition of a 
Palestinian state 
0 0 
Coexisting of Israel and a 
viable Palestinian state 
0 0 
Recognition after peace 
negotiations 
0 0 
Multilateral cooperation in 
achieving a two-state solution  
0 0 
Condemning of Israel 0 0 
Condemning of Palestinian 
Authority/Hamas 
0 0 
Right of Israel to exist 0 0 
Note: No mentioning of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
No mentioning of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
 
The Green party manifesto does not mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Or the Middle-East 
or any region besides the EU at all. The manifesto does argue that military intervention should 
be avoided and that social and living conditions have to be fair and acceptable to enhance 
sustainable peace (Miljöpartiet de gröna manifesto 2013, 35). However the Green Party minister 
for International Development Cooperation did publicly defend the recognition of Palestine by 
her Cabinet in an official press release (government.se 2014).  
The social democratic party manifesto does not mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict either, 
but it does mention that Sweden should adopt an active foreign policy. Foreign policy should be 
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aimed at maintaining and enhancing peace and stability of the Scandinavian region and 
enhancing international security. Furthermore they wish to spread the norms of freedom and 
(nuclear) disarmament and taking a leading role in the settlement of international disputes 
(Social demokraterna manifesto 2013, 32).  Even though the official election party manifesto does 
not mention their preference towards recognizing Palestine, it was adopted during the 37th party 
congress in 2013 (Kuttab 2014). The official congress protocol of the 37th congress states that the 
party needs to push forward the official recognition of Palestine to give both states an equal 
standpoint in negotiations for peace (Kongress protokoll 2013, 116). Kutabb argues that the close 
ideological ties between Fatah and the social democrats is important to take into account, both 
parties being part of the Socialist International (2014). These ties are also mentioned in the 
Kongress protokoll, sister parties from all over the world are being welcomed at the congress 
(2013, 4). At this party congress there also two members of the Palestinian social democratic 
party Fatah present (Kongress protokoll 2013, 17). A striking detail is that at the congress there 
were many representatives of social democratic parties from all over the world but no 
representative of an Israeli sister party, like for example the Israeli Labour Party or Meretz 
which are also members of the Socialist International (Socialist International 2015).  
United Kingdom  
  In the case of the United Kingdom, there are three parties to take into account. Because in 
the UK the resolution has not been initiated by a coalition party but by the biggest opposition 
party. The incumbent coalition government, at the time of the resolution, consisted of two 
parties, the Conservative party that held 306 seats and the Liberal Democrats which had 57 
seats. The biggest opposition party was the Labour Party with 258 seats in the House of 
Commons (The Electoral Commission 2010). The resolution in parliament was accepted by a 
majority of 274 ayes versus 12 nays. The rest of the House of Commons abstained from voting, 
including all members of the government.  
Table 4.4 Conservative Party, Lib Dem party and Labour party standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel  
Possible party answers to 
the Palestinian/Israeli 
conflict according to Party 
Conservative Party Liberal Democrats Labour Party 
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manifesto 
Unilateral recognition of a 
Palestinian state 
0 0 0 
Coexisting of Israel and a 
viable Palestinian state 
X X X 
Recognition after peace 
negotiations 
0 0 0 
Multilateral cooperation 
in achieving a two-state 
solution  
X 0 X 
Condemning of Israel 0 X 0 
Condemning of 
Palestinian 
Authority/Hamas 
0 X 0 
Right of Israel to exist X X 0 
 
  Reading the Labour party manifesto for the General Elections of 2010, we see that Labour 
has a small section on Israel and Palestine. The manifesto states: “We support the creation of a 
viable Palestinian state that can live alongside a secure Israel. All the countries of the region 
have a role to play in delivering the vision of the Arab Peace Initiative - normalized relations 
between Arab states and Israel in return for a Palestinian state” (Labour Party Manifesto 2010, 
71). This standpoint does not reflect direct support for recognition of Palestine. The official 
manifesto seems to prefer peace negotiations within the region between the different states 
involved over unilateral recognition. This is also reflected in statements in the press (Wright 
2014). This seems in contrast with what some frontbenchers of the Party stated in the weeks 
before the resolution. Media reported on internal disputes over the recognition vote (Wright 
2014). Important Labour shadow Cabinet ministers like Ed Milliband, Ed Balls and Caroline 
Flynt were in favor of recognition. They urged the other members to vote in favor as well, while 
many of them had serious doubts and moral obligations (Wright 2014).  
  The conservative party stresses, in its manifesto, that they will “support a two-state 
solution to the Middle East Peace Process. The manifesto argues furthermore that the 
Conservative Party is “skeptical about grand utopian schemes to remake the world”. It also 
asserts that the Party prefers to deepen its alliances beyond Europe and the United States and 
enhance their relationships with friendly nations in the world, including in the Middle East 
(Conservative Party manifesto 2010, 109-110). In press statement surrounding the resolution, 
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David Cameron, the Conservative Prime Minister, stated that the United Kingdom would only 
recognize Palestine when there is a genuine two-state solution which ensures Israel’s future 
(Silvera 2014). While the Labour party threatened to whip its MPs to vote in favor of the 
resolution, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrat members were free to vote what 
they wanted (Silvera 2014). Most abstained from voting but some conservatives voted in favor 
and a small minority voted against the resolution (Goodman 2014).  
  The last party in the government coalition is the Liberal Democrat Party. In their party 
manifesto for the 2010 elections, the party argued that they would “remain committed to the 
search for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. A sustainable solution can be 
reached in the context of two separate Israeli and Palestinian states, mutually recognized and 
internationally accepted within borders which are secure and based on the situation before the 
1967 conflict. We condemn disproportionate force used by all sides. We believe Britain and the 
EU must put pressure on Israel and Egypt to end the blockade of Gaza” (Liberal Democrat Party 
manifesto 2010, 68). Most of the Liberal Democrats MPs voted in favor of the resolution, except 
for the Liberal Democrat ministers. But this is, according to the BBC, regarded as a convention in 
British politics when a resolution has been initiated by a less prominent backbench MP (BBC 
2014).   
  In conclusion, most parties are openly in favor of the two-state solution. However none 
of the party manifestoes clearly stated that they support a unilateral recognition. The Swedish 
party manifestos for example do not mention it at all. But in older party documents and internal 
resolutions, it becomes clear that the Social Demokraterna has close ties with the Palestinian 
Fatah party. It can be argued that in the case of Sweden party, ideology explains why Palestine 
has been recognized unilaterally. The French case shows similarities with the Swedish Social 
Democrats. However, the Parti Socialiste does mention the conflict in their party manifesto and 
condemns Israel for continuing the building of settlements on Palestinian territories. But in their 
manifesto, they do not directly open the door to unilateral recognition. However, in a statement 
on their website they argue that the party has been in favor of recognition since 2011. Party 
ideology explains why the Parti Socialiste initiated the parliamentary resolution, and why most 
party members voted in favor of the resolution. In the United Kingdom the resolution was 
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initiated by a backbench member of the Labour party, but many prominent MPs were also in 
favor of the resolution, including the now, former party leader Ed Milliband. As with the other 
cases, their party manifesto does not explicitly supports recognition of Palestine. The party does 
not seem to be officially in favor of recognition. There were internal disputes over the resolution. 
It seems like some MPs, including prominent members were in favor while others were against 
the resolution (Lewis 2014). Therefore it cannot be concluded that it was only party ideology 
that can explain why the resolution had been initiated and accepted.  
  In the case of Germany there was no resolution or initiative to recognize Palestine. But 
one of the party manifestoes did have an interesting aspect. The CDU/CSU states that Germany 
has a special responsibility towards Israel as a Jewish state, and that their policy towards the 
conflict has to be seen in this light. This special responsibility comes from the atrocities 
committed by the German Nazis towards the Jewish people of Europe during World War Two. 
For Germany, party ideology does not explain why it does not recognize Palestine, but it seems 
their historical responsibility towards Israel does. In the cases of France and Sweden it seems 
that party ideology determined the incumbent parties’ willingness to recognize Palestine 
although it is not the same type of recognition. For France and Sweden hypothesis 4 can be 
accepted. But for the cases of the United Kingdom and Germany the hypothesis needs to be 
rejected. However the hypothesis cannot explain the differences in types of recognition.     
 
H5 Palestine’s acceptance to different international organizations and treaties.  
  Over the years more organizations have accepted Palestine as an official member. 
Palestine has become an official member of a total of 16 different international organizations. 
The Palestinian authorities have also been able to develop diplomatic relations with other states 
and to become a member of and to implement different international treaties. Table 5.1 to 5.3 
show the different organizations and treaties in which Palestine has become a member over the 
years.  
International Organizations  
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  Table 5.1 shows the international organizations in which Palestine is an official member. 
Palestine has become an official member of at least 16 different organizations between 1969 and 
2015, first as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and later as the Palestinian Authority 
or Palestinian State.  It seems that before 2005, Palestine was able to become an official member 
of primarily non-Western organizations and especially Arab organizations and the Non-
Alignment Movement. While after 2005 they have been able to become an official member of 
different human rights institutions, the red cross and crescent federation. Palestine’s official 
membership to UNESCO is described as a milestone in the history of the Palestinian state, 
because it is argued by some international law scholars, like Jure Vidmar (2014) that the 
membership of UNESCO has more legal implications than its observer state status within the 
UN General Assembly. The statute of UNESCO explicitly says that only states can become a 
member and that these new member states of UNESCO can join the organization by a two third 
majority of votes in the general assembly (Vidmar 2014, 41). The most recent international 
organization that Palestine has joined was the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015. 
Table 5.1 International organizations in which Palestine is an official member 
International organization Year of admission 
1. Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC 2015) 
1969 (OIC 2015) 
2. Non-alignment Movement (NAM 2015) 1976 (Cahoon 2015) 
3. League of Arab States (lasportal.org 
2015) 
1976 (lasportal.org 2015) 
4. United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia 
(escwa.un.org 2015).  
1977 (escwa.un.org 2015) 
5. International Coordinating Committee 
of National Human Rights Institutions 
(nhri.ohchr.org) 
2005 (nhri.ohchr.org) 
6. International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies and 
Movement (palestinercs.org) 
2006 (Cahoon 2015) 
7. Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Mediterranean (pam.int 2015)  
2006 (Cahoon 2015) 
8. Parliamentary Assembly - Union for the 
Mediterranean (europarl.europa.eu 
2015) 
2008 (europarl.europa.eu 2015) 
9. Inter-Parliamentary Union (ipu.org 
2015) 
2008 (ipu.org 2015) 
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10. Asian parliamentary Assembly 
(asianparliament.org 2008) 
2006/200811  (asianparliament.org 2008) 
11. Group of 77 (g77.org 2015) Unknown 
12. International Trade Union 
Confederation (ituc-csi.org 2015) 
2006 (became a member at the establishment of 
the organization) 
13. Alliance for Financial Inclusion (afi-
global.org 2015) 
2010 (afi-global.org 2015) 
14. Unesco (unesco 2012, 220) 2011 (unesco 2012, 220) 
15. ISO IBAN regristry (swift.com 2015, 10 
& 62) 
2012 (swift.com 2015, 10) 
16. International Criminal Court (icc-cpi.int 
2015) 
201512 (icc-cpi.int 2015) 
 
International treaties 
 Tables 5.2 and 5.3 give an overview of the 44 international treaties that Palestine has 
joined as a state party and the 10 regional treaties and peace treaties with Israel. The website of 
the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN has published lists of all the UN treaties 
Palestine has joined. Most of the treaties are international law treaties and human rights 
conventions. Since Palestine joined the ICC, they also joined the international treaties on armed 
conflicts and warfare and a special declaration that states that Palestine grants the ICC 
jurisdiction over its territory.   
Table 5.2 International treaties and conventions which Palestine has joined 
Name of Treaties (in random order, retrieved from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to 
the UN website and recent UNESCO treaties) 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
3. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
4. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
6. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
8. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
                                                          
11 It is not exactly mentioned when Palestine joined this organization, but the actions of Israel were condemned in 
the first resolutions of the organization of 2006 and a member of the Palestinian Assembly participated in a 
committee on political issues in 2008.  
12 Although Palestine became a member in January 2015, Palestine officially accepted its jurisdiction since June 
2014.  
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Children in Armed Conflict 
9. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
10. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
11. United Nations Convention against Corruption 
12. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
15. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on land and its 
Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
16. Geneva Convention (I) on Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 17 Geneva 
Convention (II) on the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949 
Geneva Convention (III) on Prisoners of war, 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) on Civilians 
1949.  
17. Additional Protocol (I) relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts 
18. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
19. Protocol Additional (III) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem 
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
21. Declaration 12 (3) granting retroactive jurisdiction to the ICC  (since 3 June 2014) 
22. Agreements on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court 
23. Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity 
24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
25. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
26. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime  
27. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
28. Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
29. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
30. Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention Weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (with 
protocols I, II and III) 
31. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
32. Convention on Cluster Munitions 
33. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
34. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
35. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
36. Convention on Biological Diversity 
37. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
38. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal 
39. UNESCO constitution (unesco 2012, 5-18 & 220) 
40. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (unesco 
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2014) 
41. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(unesco 2015) 
42. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention (unesco 2012) 
43. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Unesco 2015) 
44. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (Unesco 2015) 
 
  In the debate in the House of Commons, no MP used the argument that Palestine should 
be recognized by the British Government because they had been able to join international 
organizations and that it is therefore legitimate to recognize Palestine. It was not in the official 
text of the resolution either (parliament.uk 2014). However a few MPs did state that Palestine 
was, according to the international community and different international organizations ready 
for recognition. For example Mr. Andrew Love, a Labour MP, stated during the debate:  
 
“The Palestinians have waited a very long time for this debate, but the developing international 
consensus is that Palestine is ready for recognition. 134 countries have now recognised it 
diplomatically, including some members of the European Union, and the new Swedish 
Government made Sweden the 135th at the beginning of October. UN observer status was 
granted in 2011 by 138 votes to nine. There were 41 abstentions, including by the United 
Kingdom, but France, Italy and Spain all voted yes. Contrary to what the right hon. and learned 
Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the European Union have all separately reported that the institutions in Palestine are 
appropriate for the formation of a state” (parliament.uk 2014).  
 
  The French proposition for the resolution on the other hand does explicitly mention the 
fact that Palestine joined UNESCO and that France voted in favor of Palestine’s observer 
membership:  
“Elle s’est honorée en votant en 2011 en faveur de l’adhésion des Palestiniens comme membres à 
part entière de l’UNESCO, puis en disant « oui » à l’accession de la Palestine au statut d’État 
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non-membre de l’ONU en novembre 2012. Fidèles à cette position historique et équilibrée, les 
signataires manifestent, par la présente résolution, leur attachement à une reprise sans délai des 
négociations devant aboutir à un règlement définitif du conflit israélo-palestinien” (Assemblée 
Nationale 2014, 5)”.   
  The Swedish government released an article on why they chose to recognize Palestine. 
The reasons for their recognition were among others, the wish to express support for the 
moderate Palestinian forces, the fact that Palestine met the legal requirements, to make the 
parties at a future negotiations table less unequal and finally to give the people of Palestine hope 
and optimism. But there is no mentioning of Palestine joining international organizations and 
treaties. (Walström 2014).  
  In conclusion, hypothesis 5 of Palestine’s integration into international institutions was 
partly used as a justification for recognition of Palestine. Hypothesis 5 has to be accepted for the 
case of France and partly for the case of the United Kingdom. For the cases of Germany and 
Sweden, hypothesis 5 has to be rejected.   
 
Hypothesis 6 nature of bilateral ties with Israel 
  For this hypothesis three factors were taken into account, namely the economic ties with 
Israel, the weapon trade with Israel and the diplomatic ties with Israel.  
France 
  France is the twelfth biggest trading partner for Israel’s imports and the tenth biggest 
exporting country for Israel’s exports according to the official list of Israel’s main trading 
partners (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-28). Israel does not show up in the top ten 
of biggest trading partners of France (Trésor Direction Générale 2014). France imports and 
exports with Israel are worth about 1,15 billion Euros (France Diplomatie 2015).  France has 
bought one Heron Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle from Israel in the period 2010-2014, the 
deal was worth 30,3 million euros (see annex 2). In 2014 there were five bilateral visits between 
France and Israel. Only one high level French minister visited both Israel and the Palestinian 
territories in 2014. The Israeli minister of foreign affairs visited France twice in 2014 (. By 
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contrast in the previous years there were more visits. For example in 2013 there have been 
thirteen bilateral visits and in 2012 there were nine bilateral visits (Ambassade de France à Tel 
Aviv 2012; 2013; 2014).   
 
Germany 
  For Israel, Germany is the fourth biggest trading partner with regards to their imports, 
and the ninth biggest exporting country for Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-
28). For Germany, Israel is within the top 50 of export and import markets, respectively at the 
41st  and place 49th positions (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 2). Furthermore, Germany is the 
biggest weapon trade partner of Israel compared to the other countries. Germany has sold 635 
tank engines to Israel, several submarines and submarine frigates and an advanced radar 
system, together with 1620 anti-tank missiles and five Heron Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV) (See Annex 2). The diplomatic ties between both countries are tight. According to the 
German embassy in Tel Aviv this is because of the special relation both countries have due to 
the Shoah caused by Nazi-Germany during World War Two. Since 2008 there have been annual 
Government consultations. In 2014 both governments have met for the fifth time. At these 
meetings all members of both cabinets are present to discuss matters and to strengthen the 
bilateral ties (Deutsche Botschaft in Tel Aviv 2015). 
Sweden 
For Israel, Sweden is a less important trading partner. It does not show up in the list of biggest 
trading partners for import nor export (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-28).  For 
Sweden Israel does not show up in their central bureau of statistics lists of main export and 
import partners either (Sveriges Officiella statistik 2015). Furthermore Sweden did not buy or 
sell any weapons from or to Israel. In 2014 there have been no high level bilateral meetings 
between Sweden and Israel. There were some lower level meetings, for example in February 
2014 the First Deputy Speaker of the Swedish parliament visited Israel, Jordan and Palestine 
with a delegation of the Swedish parliament (Embassy of Sweden Tel Aviv 2014). In March the 
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Directors General for Political Affairs and International Development and Cooperation visited 
Israel, to discuss domestic and regional issues (Embassy of Sweden Tel Aviv 2014).  
 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is the ninth biggest trading partner for Israel when it comes to countries it 
imports from, and the third biggest exporting country for Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2015, 26-28). For the United Kingdom, Israel is within the top 50 of export and import 
markets, respectively at the 38th  and 48th positions (Office for National Statistics 2015, 44). The 
United Kingdom and Israel are the second biggest weapon trading partners of all cases. The 
United Kingdom bought a total of 59 unmanned combat aerial vehicles, 200 Spike NLOS 
missiles from Israel. In 2014 there were ten different high level visits by ministers and secretaries 
to Israel. Only the top level ministers like the Foreign secretary and the Prime Minister visited 
both Israel and the Palestinian territories, the lower level ministers have only visited Israel 
(gov.uk 2014).  Furthermore the Palestinian President visited the United Kingdom in May 2014 
(Gov.uk 2014).  
  In sum the bilateral ties with Israel differs per case. The bilateral economic and 
diplomatic ties of Germany and Israel are tight because of the special relation between both 
countries due to the holocaust. Furthermore Israel and Germany have traded more weapon 
systems when compared to France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. France and the United 
Kingdom both have good economic relations with Israel, but have smaller defense ties. It can be 
argued that these two countries have somewhat economic and diplomatic costs to lose, but far 
less than Germany. When looking at the different cases, Germany seems to have the most 
economic and diplomatic costs to lose with Israel. Sweden on the other hand has far less 
economic and diplomatic costs to lose with Israel and did not buy or sell any weapons to or 
from Israel.  The nature of the bilateral ties seem to overlap with the type or recognition of 
Palestine. The case with the least costs (Sweden) recognized Palestine officially. France and the 
UK, just like Germany have trade interests with Israel. But have less diplomatic and economic 
costs than Germany, however they have more costs than Sweden. When it comes to the 
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recognition of Palestine they have not officially recognized Palestine, as a state but only in a 
symbolic way, through their parliaments. Therefore hypothesis six has to be accepted for all 
cases, the nature of bilateral ties seems to have influenced the type of recognition.  
 
Discussion 
Table 7.1 Hypotheses Truth Table   
Hypothesis France Germany Sweden United Kingdom 
1. Public opinion Confirmed  Confirmed  Not available  Confirmed  
2a. Pro-Palestinian 
Interest groups 
Confirmed  Rejected  Confirmed  Confirmed  
2b. Pro-Israel Interest 
Groups 
Confirmed  Rejected  Confirmed  Confirmed  
3. Media coverage  Confirmed  Rejected  Confirmed  Confirmed  
4. Party ideology Confirmed  Rejected  Confirmed  Rejected  
5. Acceptance of 
Palestine in 
organizations and 
treaties 
Confirmed  Rejected  Rejected  Confirmed  
6. Bilateral ties with 
Israel 
Confirmed  Confirmed  Confirmed  Confirmed  
 
  In conclusion, states consider several factors before they recognize new states. Most of 
these reasons are political reasons. Table 7.1 gives a truth table of all hypotheses per case.  
  France has recognized Palestine symbolically for several reasons. In France public 
opinion was in favor of recognition and could possibly be a pressure for the political elite to vote 
for recognition of Palestine. Pro-Palestinian interest groups tried to lobby for recognition at the 
National Assembly, while at the same time some Jewish and Pro-Israel interest groups were 
lobbying for non-recognition. The French political system is not formally open to lobbying. 
Therefore the factor of interest groups cannot explain why France recognized Palestine 
symbolically. The leftwing media were in favor of recognition and could have pressured the 
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incumbent Parti Socialiste to vote in favor of recognition. Recognition of Palestine was an official 
Parti Socialiste standpoint and was an initiative of this party in parliament. The factor of 
international integration of Palestine was specifically mentioned in the resolution in French 
parliament and was therefore one of the reasons for recognizing Palestine. The factor that 
explains why France did not recognize Palestine officially but in an symbolic way is the nature 
of bilateral ties. France did not recognize Palestine because the economic and diplomatic costs 
would be too high.  
  In Germany public opinion was largely in favor of recognition. This majority was even 
bigger than in the other cases. However, no pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli interest groups were 
really active on the matter of recognition. The media however was not in favor of recognition. 
The more left-wing newspaper had a neutral point of view while the more right-wing 
newspaper’s articles were against recognition and pro-Israel. The political elites in of the 
incumbent parties were against official recognition, and the CDU/CSU stressed the special 
relationship and responsibility of Germany towards the Jewish state of Israel. The fact that 
Palestine has been able to integrate different international organizations did not matter either.  
Furthermore Germany’s  economic and diplomatic ties with Israel are significant. Both countries 
are important trading partners and have developed defense ties. The diplomatic ties are also 
warm. This is again because Germany argues it has a special responsibility to the Jewish people 
and the state of Israel. The reason why Germany has not recognized Palestine at all is most 
likely because of the country’s particular history and its close bilateral ties with Israel.  
  The reasons why Sweden has officially recognized Palestine are because pro-Palestinian 
interest groups have lobbied intensely on the matter of recognition, but at the same time so did 
pro-Israeli interest groups, the media was also in favor of recognition in Sweden. But the most 
important reason is because it was a preference of the incumbent government and especially the 
Social Demokraterna, who has close ties with its Palestinian sister party Fatah. However 
Palestinian integration was not a reason why Sweden chose to recognize Palestine according to 
the official statements of the minister of foreign affairs Margot Wallström. The bilateral ties with 
Israel were not as tight as in the other cases. This can explain why Sweden has officially 
recognized Palestine while the United Kingdom and France didn’t do so officially.    
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  In the United Kingdom a majority of the public was in favor of recognition. Interest 
groups of both the pro-Palestinian side and the pro-Israeli side were active in trying to influence 
lawmakers. The media was partly in favor of recognition. The more left-wing newspaper The 
Independent’s articles were pro-recognition while the right-wing newspaper The Daily Telegraph’s 
coverage of the recognition of Palestine was more neutral. Party ideology did not seem to matter 
that much in the British case. Because none of the parties whipped its members to vote in favor  
of recognition. The integration of Palestine into international institutions and organizations was 
not mentioned in the official text of the resolution, nor in the debates as a reason to recognize 
Palestine officially. It was however argued that some international organizations like the IMF 
had argued that Palestine’s institutions were ready to become an official state. The nature of 
bilateral ties did explain why the United Kingdom did not officially recognize Palestine. Great 
Britain and Israel are have good economic ties and traded different weapon systems.  
  Through the different cases this thesis has tried to find an answer to the question, why 
have some Western European states recognized the Palestinian state, during the period 
September 2014 and December 2014, while others have not?  The hypothesis that answers this 
question best is the nature of bilateral ties with Israel. It seems that the economic and diplomatic 
costs and loss of weapon trade explain best in every case why they recognized Palestine either 
officially or symbolically or why they did not recognize Palestine at all. Although in Germany 
these close ties are due to its particular history.  
 Every research has its limitations, this research is of course no exception to this. It is 
possible that this research did not include all variables and hypotheses for recognition. 
Furthermore the public opinion polls of Sweden might not be completely representative, 
because the polls were at least ten years old and did not ask specific question on recognition of 
Palestine. This can only be improved by carrying out a representative public opinion poll on the 
question of recognition in each of the cases.   
  It has to be admitted that the pressure of  interest groups being successful is hard to 
measure. Future research could benefit from doing a more in depth analysis of interest groups 
trying to influence political elites in their decision to recognize states. It should also focus more 
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on the specific political system in which groups try to lobby.   
  The media coverage results might be biased due to low intercoder reliability and 
conclusions should be tempered because not that many articles were included. This could be 
solved by taking more articles into account and have more than one coder to analyze the articles.  
  Despite the limitations this thesis has given some insight in why some Western-European 
states have started to recognize Palestine as a state, either officially or symbolically. The main 
factor that seems to explain the differences in the type of recognition are the bilateral ties of the 
states with Israel. The theoretical framework and hypotheses could be further tested in other 
cases, such as Spain and Ireland, but also the more recent case of the official recognition of 
Palestine by the Vatican.  
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Annex 2  
Coding Scheme 
Categories Wording used in the selected 
newspaper articles  
1).  A more pro-Palestinian and 
critical to Israel standpoint 
towards the issue of recognition of 
Palestine 
- Stressing the (suffering of) the 
Palestinian people.  
- stressing the (good) relations 
with the Palestinian authorities. 
-  mentioning the viability of a 
Palestinian state. 
- mentioning the Gaza War. 
- mentioning the killing of 
Palestinians. 
- mentioning of occupation of 
Gaza and the West Bank. 
- mentioning arguments in favor of 
recognition 
- interviewing people that are in 
favor of recognition 
- mentioning MPs and parties that 
will vote in favor of recognition 
2). A more pro-Israeli and critical 
to Palestinian statehood standpoint 
towards the issue of recognition of 
Palestine 
- stressing the suffering of the 
Israeli people. 
-  Stressing the (good) relations 
with Israel. 
- mentioning that Palestine is not 
capable of controlling its own 
territory. 
- mentioning the killing of Israelis.  
- questioning the statehood of 
Palestine in general. 
- mentioning arguments against 
recognition 
- interviewing people that are 
against the recognition 
- mentioning MPs and parties that 
will vote against recognition 
- mentioning Israel’s opinions on 
the matter of recognition 
- mentioning Israel’s opinions on 
the Palestinian Authority, Fatah 
and Hamas 
3). A more neutral standpoint 
towards the issue of recognition of 
Palestine. 
- mentioning and focusing on facts  
- mentioning MPs and parties that 
will abstain from voting 
-Remaining the status quo 
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Annex 3 France 
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for 
year range 2010 to 2014 
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning 
of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed 
separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on 
the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and 
acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available. 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Information generated: 14 April 2015 
 
  
Supplier/     Year Year(s) No.  
 recipient (R) No. Weapon Weapon of order/ of delivered/  
 or licenser (L) ordered designation description licence deliveries produced
 Comments 
  
  
Israel 
R: France 1 Heron UAV 2009 2010 1 $34 m 
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Annex 4 Germany part 1 
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for 
year range 2010 to 2014 
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning 
of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed 
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separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on 
the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and 
acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available. 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Information generated: 14 April 2015 
 
  
Supplier/     Year Year(s) No.  
 recipient (R) No. Weapon Weapon of order/ of delivered/  
 or licenser (L) ordered designation description licence deliveries produced
 Comments 
  
  
Israel 
L: Germany (FRG) (3000) Spike-MR/LR Anti-tank missile (2009) 2010-2014 (1620)
 'M
ELL
S' 
prog
ram
me; 
Spik
e-LR 
versi
on; 
for 
Pum
a 
IFV 
 
R: Germany (FRG) (5) Heron UAV 2009 2010-2011 (5)
 'SA
ATE
G-
ZwL' 
prog
ram
me; 
lease 
(origi
nally 
3 
year
s; 
EUR
75 m 
deal 
for 
2-
year 
exte
nsio
n 
2012
); for 
use 
73 
 
in 
Afgh
anist
an 
       . . Harop SSM (2013)   For 
WAB
EP 
reco
nnai
ssan
ce/at
tack 
syste
m; 
selec
ted 
but 
possi
bly 
not 
yet 
orde
red 
by 
end-
2014 
Annex 4 Germany part 2 
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for 
year range 2010 to 2014 
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning 
of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed 
separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on 
the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and 
acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available. 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Information generated: 14 April 2015 
 
  
Supplier/     Year Year(s) No.  
 recipient (R) No. Weapon Weapon of order/ of delivered/  
 or licenser (L) ordered designation description licence deliveries produced
 Comments 
  
  
Germany (FRG) 
R: Israel (790) MTU-883 Diesel engine (2000) 2002-2014 (635) For 
Mer
kava
-4 
tanks 
and 
Nam
er 
74 
 
APC 
prod
uced 
in 
Israe
l; 
asse
mble
d in 
USA 
from 
com
pone
nts 
prod
uced 
in 
FRG 
       2 Dolphin/Type-800 Submarine 2006 2012-2013 2 EUR1 
b 
deal 
(33
% 
finan
ced 
by 
FRG
) 
       1 MPQ-53 SAM system radar 2011 2011 1
 Se
cond
-
hand
; 
loan 
(whil
e 
Israe
li 
radar 
bein
g 
mod
erniz
ed) 
       1 Dolphin/Type-800 Submarine 2012  
 EU
R40
5 m 
deal 
(33
% 
finan
ced 
by 
FRG
) 
       (4) MEKO-A100 Frigate (2014)  
 Sel
75 
 
ected 
but 
not 
yet 
order
ed 
by 
end-
2014
; incl 
30% 
paid 
by 
Ger
man
y 
 
Annex 5 United Kingdom 
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for 
year range 2010 to 2014 
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning 
of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed 
separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on 
the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and 
acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers 
Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available. 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Information generated: 14 April 2015 
 
  
Supplier/     Year Year(s) No.  
 recipient (R) No. Weapon Weapon of order/ of delivered/  
 or licenser (L) ordered designation description licence deliveries produced
 Comments 
  
  
Israel 
L: United Kingdom 54 Hermes-450 UAV 2005 2012-2014 (54) Part of 
GBP
700 
m-
GBP
1 b 
($1.2
-1.6 
b) 
'Wat
chke
eper' 
prog
ram
me 
(incl 
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GBP
300
m 
for 
prod
ucer 
of 
Her
mes-
450) 
most 
prod
uced 
in 
UK; 
UK 
desig
natio
n 
WK-
450 
 
R: United Kingdom (200) Spike-NLOS SSM/ASM (2009) 2011-2012 (200) Spike-
NLO
S 
Mk-5 
versi
on; 
deve
lopm
ent 
partl
y 
finan
ced 
by 
UK; 
for 
use 
in 
Afgh
anist
an; 
UK 
desig
natio
n 
Exac
tor 
       5 Hermes-450 UAV 2012 2012 5 Part of 
'Proj
ect 
Lydia
n'; 
for 
use 
in 
77 
 
Afgh
anist
an 
 
 
